

NSC BRIEFING

7 September 1955

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State Dept. review completed

- I. Peron's 31 August speech, in which he withdrew his earlier offer to resign, and called on his followers to prepare to fight violence with "even greater violence," may have led army leaders to reconsider their support of him.
 - A. The top military leadership, which holds the dominant power position in the government, has been supporting Peron on the condition that he follow moderate policies.
 - B. Reportedly this support of Peron by the army leaders has been strongly disliked in the lower military echelons, particularly in the provinces. Even some high ranking officers advocated Peron's resignation on 30 August, [REDACTED]

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- II. A revolution beginning in the provinces would probably be unsuccessful unless there was close cooperation and coordination among the provincial commands and the rebel forces in the Navy and Air Force.

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However, if the army top command in Buenos Aires tried to force Peron out, and he called on the Argentine General Confederation of Labor to support him, civil war could ensue.

- B. The US Embassy in Buenos Aires reported that the 31 August labor rally and general strike was a successful demonstration of Peron's continued labor support and his ability to marshall the masses.
- C. To date, no revolutionary outbreaks have been reported.